

TS No. 116931

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11 JAN 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director/Intelligence

SUBJECT: Scientific and Technical Intelligence -  
General (Recommendation No. 15 of  
the October 4, 1961 Report to the  
President by the President's Foreign  
Intelligence Advisory Board)

1. Attached are our preliminary comments on the subject draft report which were discussed with representatives of [redacted] staff on 21 December 1961. This meeting resulted in agreement to changes and modifications in the report so as to reflect the majority of the points covered by our comments.

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2. The section on ELINT and Telemetry (Section 6) as written is unsatisfactory to OSI and has not been resolved through discussion. A proposed revision (Tab A of attachment) has been prepared and submitted to the Assistant for Coordination. The nature of the final version of this section is not known at this time. However, we will comment as appropriate when the final report is received.

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[redacted]  
HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.  
Assistant Director  
Scientific Intelligence

Attachment:

Comments on Draft

TS 116919/A, Cy 3/ with original  
TS 116919, Cy 3/ with original

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Copies 1&2-Addressee, 3&4-AD/SI, 5-6-7-Staff  
OSI:Staff: [redacted] (5 Jan 62)

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**TOP SECRET**

**COMMENTS ON DRAFT REPORT  
ON SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE TO  
CHAIRMAN, USIB, BY ASSISTANT FOR COORDINATION  
DATED 15 DECEMBER 1961**

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1. Comments are keyed to numbered sections of the draft report. These sections, in turn, support recommendations contained in the draft memorandum from the Chairman, United States Intelligence Board.

2. Section 1 of the report portrays the over-all status of scientific intelligence as being worse than is actually the case. We suggest rewording which will highlight to a greater degree the inadequate area as being the policy, planning, research and design stages of Soviet technological achievements for, in our opinion, the level of intelligence on the basic scientific capabilities of the Soviet Bloc is more than barely adequate, as stated in the report.

3. Section 2, concerning the Exploitation of Open Literature, should include a statement supporting greater selectivity in the exploitation of open literature concomitant with increased volume of translated materials. This objective is essential to any program involving increased exploitation by either human or machine translators. Further, we believe that it would be premature to go into operational status from the present state of the art in machine translations. Therefore we suggest that support to the Air Force and CIA projects be specifically related to further research for the purpose of perfecting and demonstrating a satisfactory capability.

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Comments on Draft Report 2

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5. Section 4, concerning the Exploitation of Material, requires no comment inasmuch as this particular program has not been of great value to this Office.

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7. Comments on Section 6, concerning ELINT and Telemetry, are attached as Tab A.

8. Section 7, concerning Development of Technical Collection Methods and Devices, contains a proposal that any new technical collection method be submitted to the United States Intelligence Board for review. It is suggested that this section propose a committee or sub-board to

Comments on Draft Report

3

review and screen each project after appropriate inter-agency coordination and that only major projects be submitted to the parent Board for its review. Such provision would prevent an unwarranted workload on the United States Intelligence Board.

9. Section 8, concerning the Problem of Analysis, makes reference to possible duplication of effort between OSI and the military services because of the existence of our Air and Naval Weapons Branch. We will coordinate our activities with the Defense Intelligence Agency to ensure a minimum of duplication of effort, as well as maximum supplemental support to the analysis and production effort of the military services as soon as Defense Intelligence Agency responsibilities for analysis and production are clearly defined. However, this Office must always maintain at least a monitoring capability in certain of these critical areas in order to provide support to Agency collection efforts and an Agency estimative position, as needed, to the Director of Central Intelligence.

10. Also within Section 8 is the proposal that the Department of Defense continue, under the staff supervision of the DIA, to provide intelligence support to military research and development programs. We concur with this proposal but suggest that this section be expanded to state OSI responsibility for support to the research and development programs of a number of non-military agencies and departments such as NASA, HEW, FAA, NSF, and the Office of Emergency Planning.

11. We have no comments on Sections 9 and 10 concerning the Use of Scientific Talent Outside the Intelligence Community and Security.

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